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500 (1883); M. D. Reynolds v. London & Lancashire Fire Ins. Co.,
129 Cal. I6, 6o Pac. 467 (19oo). These cases stress the time at which
the loss occurred as establishing the right of the insured and the liability
of the insurer. The plaintiff in the present case is in an even more
favorable position. The loss occurred at a time when there was no
question about the plaintiff's status as a mortgagee and his interest as
such was injured. Therefore, the plaintiff's right and the defendant's
liability are established and any subsequent change of position between
the plaintiff and the mortgagor, who is not here concerned, should not
release the defendant from liability, nor preclude the plaintiff from suing
on his cause of action.
The Alabama Court, in holding as it did above, is consistent with
the majority of the Alabama cases which have any bearing on the pres-
ent question. But in attempting to be consistent and to keep the plain-
tiff from recovering after foreclosure the court has lost sight of the real
issue of the case, namely, that the liability of the insurer became fixed
at a time when the insured could claim under the policy. Since the
mortgagee may recover only its interest in the policy as such interest
may appear, namely, to the extent of the deficiency judgment, the in-
surance company would lose nothing by the court's permitting this action.
EVA MAE PARKER
INTERPLEADER
LIMITATIONS ON *STATUTORY INTERPLEADER
The plaintiff sued the defendant to recover a real estate commission
based on a written contract. The defendant without answering moved
for an order of interpleader under section I1265 Ohio G.C. The
defendant alleges in his affidavit that a third party claims the commis-
sion for the same sale. The latter's claim is on an implied contract.
The interpleader was denied because the contracts were not of the
same nature and there might be liability on the part of the defendant
to each of the claimants. The William V. Ebersole Co. v. Julius Payton,
31 O.N.P. (N.S.) 190 (933).
Section i 1265 of the Ohio General Code provides: "Upon affidavit
of a defendant before answer, in an action upon contract, or for the
recovery of personal property, that a third party, without collusion with
him, has or makes a claim to the subject of the action, and that he is
ready to pay or dispose of it, as the court directs, . . . shall be allowed
to become defendant in the action, in lieu of the original defendant, who
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shall be discharged from all liabilities ." The Supreme Court of
Ohio, and courts in a great number of other states having a similar
statute, have required of this statutory interpleader elements that are
not specifically mentioned in the statute. The true bill of interpleader
granted in equity required the following as essentials in a bill: (i) Claim
to the same debt, thing or duty. (2) Privity. (3) No claim by appli-
cant in the subject matter. (4) No independent liability created by
applicant. (5) Two claimants with meritorious claims. (6) Affidavit
of non collusion. (7) Payment of res into court. (8) No responsibility
of applicant for his precarious position and ownership of res not determin-
able without hazard to applicant. State v. U. S. Fidelity and Guaranty
Co., et al., 107 0. S. 9, 14o N.E. 657 (1923); Prudential Ins. Co. of
1America v. Ostrom, 274 Ill. App. 241 (934). The Ohio statutory
interpleader includes at least the last four requirements. The case of
State v. U. S. Fidelity and Guaranty Co., et al., supra, held that the
first four requirements were also necessary. See 37 Harvard Law Rev.
388 for a criticism of this opinion.
The following cases clearly show the attitude of courts toward
statutory interpleader. In the dictum in the case of Walters v. Corlett,
,4dmx., et al., 123 Ohio St. 632, 176 N.E. 565 (193i), the court
said: "XVhile interpleader is in some measure regulated by the code,
its essential principles find their origin in the common law, and have not
been modified in the least by statutory regulations." Pfister et al v.
Harry Wade et al. 56 Cal. 43 (i88o). This action of statutory inter-
pleader does not supersede the action of interpleader, it is merely a con-
current remedy. Hoyt v. Gouge, 125 Iowa 603, iO N.W. 464
(904); Northwestern Ins. Co. v. Kidder, 162 Ind. 382, 70 N.E.
489, 66 L.R.A. 89 (1904); Stewart v. Sample, 168 Ala. 270, 53 So.
182 (1910). Section 820 of the Code of Civil Procedure in New York,
which is similar to section 11265 Ohio G.C. was held by the majority
of the court in the case of Pouch v. The Prudential Ins. Co. of America,
204 N.Y. 28; 97 N.E. 731 (1912) not to create a new ground for
interpleader, but to enable a defendant to bring in as a party defendant,
in a summary way, the adverse claimant, and is governed by the same
rules of equitable interpleader.
Many courts have eliminated the first four requirements or at least
have been more liberal in determining when these requirements are
present in a given case. The remaining requirements are sound and
necessary, because of the very nature of the remedy of interpleader
The doctrine of privity got into equity from the old common law inter-
pleader by an historical accident. 2 Reeves, History of English Law,
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635-640; Crawshay v. Thornton, 2 Nyl. and Cr. I, 4o Eng. Rep.
541 (1837). Chaffee, Modernizing Interpleader, 30 Yale L.J. 814
(1921). England has by statute eliminated the requirement of privity.
Common Law Procedure Act (i86o). Courts in the United States
have either eliminated or lessened the requirement of privity. In the
case of Sewanee Fuel & Iron Co. v. Leonard, 139 Tenn. 648, 202
S.W. 928 (1917), the court waiving the old rule of privity would not
maintain the bill of interpleader because the complainant was wrong-
doer. The privity rule is binding in absence of statutory enactment, but
this rule should only apply when the title of one claimant is wholly para-
mount to and independent from the others. First Nat'l Bank v. Rey-
nolds, 127 Me. 340, 143 A. 266 (1928). Interpleader was allowed
where no privit3 existed. Platte Valley State Bank v. National Live
Stock Bank, 155 Ill. 250, 40 N.E. 621 (1895). The above cases
show a liberal trend toward the requirement of privity, without the
necessity of statute, and therefore by statute the same result could be
obtained. If all claimants claim from a common source this is sufficient
privity. Crane v. McDonald, 118 N. Y. 648, 23 N.E. 991 (189o).
The principal case refused interpleader because the contracts were
not of the same nature. This requirement of the same debt, thing, or
duty has been treated by courts in the same manner as the doctrine of
privity. The Ohio courts have read this requirement into the statute.
State v. U. S. Fidelity and Guaranty Co. et al., supra. Courts have held
the expression "the same thing, debt, or duty," to mean that there must
not be a variance in the amounts claimed. Pfister v. Wade, supra;
A4ndrews v. Travelers Ins. Co., 145 Ga. 472, 89 S.E. 522 (1916).
An Oregon case very similar to the principal case, refused interpleader.
It was held that one of the requirements was the right to the same spe-
cific fund. Maxwell v. Frazier, 52 Or. 183, 96 Pac. 548, 18 L.R.A.
(N.S.) 102 (19o8). The case of Enterprise Lumber Co. et al. v.
First Nat. Bank, 181 Ala. 338, 61 So. 930 (1913), granted inter-
pleader although some of the claimants wanted the whole res, and others
only a part. Suppose the domicile of a party is in dispute, and he is in
danger of paying taxes to different counties or states. Should inter-
pleader be denied? Here strictly speaking, the duty is not the same.
Interpleader was denied where applicants did not claim the same duty.
Rauch et al. v. Ft. Dearborn Nat'l Bank, 223 Ill. 507, 79 N.E. 273,
i i L.R.A. (N.S.) 545-. Interpleader was granted on different forms
of action. March v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. 2oo Ala. 438, 76 So. 370
(1917)- It is immaterial if some of the claims are actionable at law, and
others in equity. Iles v. Heidenreich, 202 I1. App. I (1916). Inter-
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pleader was allowed although claims did not arise from the same con-
tract. Boyle v. Manion, 74 Miss. 572, 21 So. 530 (1896). This entire
topic is treated in the excellent article by Professor Chafee, supra. in
which he concluded that the matter of claiming the same debt should
be treated more liberally.
One might argue that statutory interpleader "in action upon con-
tract, or for recovery of personal property," is to be used only in law
actions, since actions for money due, or damages for the breach of con-
tract and for replevin, were law actions. Bridge v. Martin, 2 Ohio Dec.
Rep. 410 (i86o). Therefore the narrow common law interpleader
should govern the requirements of the statutory interpleader, since its
jurisdiction is a purely statutory one. But assuming that it was intended
to apply only to law actions, it should not be restricted in its application
by the old common law requirements. It is doubtful whether the Legis-
lature intended to require the common law essentials. The case of
Boyle v. Manion, supra, expresses a preferable view. The court said
that the intention of the Legislature was to enlarge the scope of inter-
pleader and have the rights of the parties adjudicated on the basis of
the merits of the case. In the Ohio Statute of the eight requirements of
equitable interpleader, four are in some manner mentioned. Did the
Legislature intend that the other four be included? The Ohio courts
have included them. It seems reasonable that if all eight "requirements"
were intended to be necessary, the Legislature would have so stated,
instead of mentioning only certain ones.
Because of the limited facts given in the principal case, one cannot
determine whether the applicant was responsible for his own precarious
position. He might possibly have created contractual liability to two
parties, knowing full well the results of his acts. This factor by itself
would be sufficient basis for denying any relief of interpleader.
SAM TOPOLOSKY
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS
SET-OFF AS A DEFENSE UNDER THE N. I. L.
The plaintiff executed a note and mortgage to a bank. After
maturity the bank indorsed and assigned the note and mortgage to the
defendant insurance company. At the time of the transfer the plaintiff
had on deposit in the bank a larger sum than the balance then due upon
the note. No notice of the transfer was given to the plaintiff until after
the bank had closed its doors. The plaintiff prayed that his deposit be
